Sunday, November 15, 2015

IS Likely to Increase Attempts to Raid and Control Three Specific Roads



Proper logistical and strategic planning are absolutely vital in warfare, especially in a conflict where a belligerent has limited resources.


The massive volume of FSA/Islamists forces engaging the SAA/allies in Northern Hama and the Ghab plain has required large numbers of SAA/allied reinforcements to be dispatched to those areas. The RuAF has been occupied disproportionately with this front, as compared to all other ongoing SAA/allied efforts (ex: Palmyra, Aleppo).


Controlling infrastructure is not as exciting or symbolic as capturing a population center or military facility. However, it is often of much higher value. Controlling highways allows for the transportation of manpower and equipment and the evacuation of wounded at an accelerated rate. It also prevents the enemy from the same benefits, and can also isolate pockets of militants behind newly established front lines.


Specific to the IS: there exists several highways, currently held by SAA/allied forces, which are close to IS front lines. These include Khanasir to al-Ithriyah, al-Ithriyah to Sabburah, and Furqlus to Palmyra.


Controlling these stretches of highways serves another purpose: linking three important areas of IS operations (Raqqa, Palmyra, and Eastern Homs). Controlling these transportation lanes would improve the ability of the IS to fluidly transfer men and equipment to the most active front quickly.


The additional benefit is a force multiplier. Although the IS fights the FSA and Islamist groups as frequently as the SAA/allies, the IS has an interest in causing both sides to lose men and equipment. A way to accelerate this phenomenon is to encourage conditions to foment the already existing conflict between the FSA/Islamists and the SAA/allies. By cutting the aforementioned highways, IS would isolate large pockets of SAA/allied territory from each other (Aleppo separated from Hama, Homs from Palmyra) and further escalate the danger and difficulty of traveling from Homs to Hama. If SAA/allied reinforcements are slower to reinforce SAA/allied positions, the FSA/Islamists have a higher chance of success at any engagement. As such, those groups are more likely to instigate wider and more frequent attacks. This causes casualties and equipment loss to both groups; consequently reducing the assets either can use against IS units both immediately and in the future.


This tactic is also useful in limiting the RuAF power in the conflict. A raiding operation, designed to destroy a checkpoint and install IEDs, can be successful without requiring a concentration of men and equipment, unlike an assault on a defended town or large military installation. As such, Syrian airpower and especially Russian close-air-support are much less effective against small, loosely concentrated guerilla-like forces. Given the SAA/allied large advantage from air superiority, the IS is most likely to adopt new tactics designed at limiting their enemies relative military advantages.


We have already seen the IS disrupt the Khanasir to al-Ithriyah highway with recent raids. This resulted in the IS capturing equipment, killing SAA fighters, and closing that highway temporarily. That one offensive alone was reported to have hampered food supplies to Aleppo city and demanded immediate attention of the SAA. The SAA had to divert manpower to reestablish control and clear IEDs, which reduced the amount of fighters who could have been able to join the SAA/allied offensive against the FSA/Islamists in the South Western Aleppo countryside.


We also know this is an increasingly common technique in the conflict. The IS recently(ish) seized Qaryatayn, a crossroad population center which connected Damascus to Palmyra. They very recently assaulted Sadad, a mostly empty town. The Sadad attack was not ordered for a tactical reason, to inflict casualties or establish a remote salient, but instead was a strategic choice to attempt to close one of the Damascus to Homs highways.


We have also seen this occur on smaller scales by other forces. Jays al-Islam's recent offensive put a large priority in cutting the highway adjacent to the Eastern Ghouta pocket. Again, the highway served as a major artery from Damascus to Homs. Jays al-Islam has prioritized defending this highway over continuing its assault on military/government strongholds, such as Brigade 39, the adjacent armored vehicle base, and the Adra prison.


Many Kurdish groups, likely with the assistance of Western military/intelligence planning, have also implemented this strategy with some success against the IS. Al-Shaddadi is connected to Mosul on a singular stretch of highway which passes through both Sinjar and Tal Afar. Kurdish groups have focused on controlling the highway on either side of Sinjar before the eventual assault on the city.


Consequently, I believe the IS will soon adopt a more conscious and concerted effort in raiding and controlling these areas. The direct and indirect benefits that disruption and/or control over these logistical assets appears to have the highest benefit to risk payoff available to the IS at this time.

--Jeff Chester

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