The Unapologetic Diplomat: A Review of Vali Nasr’s "The Dispensable Nation"

 

Diplomats are typically known for couching their aims and opinions in even, inoffensive terms designed to convey meaning without alienating. Mr. Nasr, a former high-ranking diplomat in Richard Holbrooke’s AfPak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) group within the State Department, has dispensed with this approach in his memoirs, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat. Mr. Nasr appears to find it difficult to hide his bitterness with what he purports to be a major failure on the part of the Administration, particularly when it comes to Middle Eastern policy. Nasr writes that continued sanctions against Iran and a general reluctance, verging on refusal, to engage the Iranian regime on Afghanistan was a serious failure by the Administration, “which showed a lack of imagination in managing both those challenges” (Nasr, Location 934). Nasr’s work contrasts starkly with the recent works of Secretaries Panetta and Gates. One of the most positive characteristics of Gates and Panetta’s works was their tendency to refrain from passing judgement on the Administration. Their criticism of the Executive largely came in questioning the consolidation of power among a few members of the National Security Staff. In a world full of pundits who seek to color history with their own lenses, both Secretaries wrote books which laid out their version of the facts without excessive spin. While one can feel their patience wear increasingly thin as they recount the sequence of events during their time in office, both of their works start out positively, whereas Mr. Nasr’s disappointment is palpable from the beginning of The Dispensable Nation.

      Nasr asserts that the military was allowed to run rampant by an administration too timid to control it. In regard to the American decision to sever close ties with Pakistan after years of rocky relations, Nasr writes,” Ours was not just an empty bluff, it was worse than that—it was folly we believed in and crafted out policy on, and all Pakistan had to do was wait for reality to set in…We did not have to break the relationship and put Pakistan’s stability at risk…We have not realized our immediate security goals there and have put our long-run strategic interests in jeopardy. Pakistan is a failure of American policy, a failure of the sort that comes from the president handing foreign policy over to the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies” (Ibid., Location 1612). Gates and Panetta, alternatively, both felt that the Administration hamstrung the military and failed in Iraq by allowing relations to deteriorate to a point when US troops withdrew from the country altogether. The Secretaries largely refrain from sweeping language, with the exception of their horror at what they characterize as an American abandonment of our duty in Iraq. Nasr is clearly a gifted academic and diplomat, but his broad stroke denunciations of the Administration’s decisions do at times, feel less like careful consideration of all aspects of policy affecting a decision and more an embittered complaint that his team’s specific aims were not achieved. It’s hard to shake the feeling that Nasr is not-so-subtlety arguing that the Administrations problems could have been solved had they just listened to Nasr and Holbrooke’s team.

Partially as a result of this, the work is certainly less fulfilling than those of Gates and Panetta. Because Nasr chooses to be so clearly biased in certain places, one is tempted to question objective analysis throughout the rest of the work. However, as a critique of the national security and foreign policy team in the White House, Nasr’s piece is valuable in that it highlights the deeply divided stances of at least some members of the diplomatic apparatus and the defense department. Similarly to the Defense Secretaries, he critiques the Administration for centralizing too much of the decision making, but he disagrees with those decisions for almost directly opposing reasons from the leaders of Defense. Where they feel the Administration has not gone far enough, Nasr argues it went too far, and vice versa. Importantly, his work contrasts with those of Gates and Panetta to show that the Administration took something of a middle road in its decision making between State and Defense. By looking at criticism from both sides, we find that perhaps the Administration was not ignoring its advisors as much as trying to find a way to mediate a series of heated debates.

      Though clearly flawed in certain ways, Nasr’s work is an insightful critique of American policy and provides an interesting warning regarding President Obama’s stated policy to pivot away from the Middle East and toward the Pacific. He cogently argues that if America does seek to counter the growth of Chinese influence globally, it is important to do this not only in East Asia but also in those areas of the world where Chinese influence is quickly increasing. In particular, he notes that if Chinese influence on the Gulf Monarchies were to continue to grow unchecked, as it has in Pakistan and Africa, “Chinese interest in Middle Eastern energy sources [would] threaten to put at a disadvantage the very allies—India, Japan, South Korea, and even much of Europe—that America needs to balance China. If these countries became dependent on China for their energy supplies they would have to align their foreign and economic policies with China, which would mean moving away from the United States. That would put a big dent into our plans for containing China in the Asia Pacific and ensuring the region’s continued prosperity and openness” (Ibid., Location 3876). His appraisal seems prophetic in light of the recent tour of the Middle East undertaken by Chinese President Xi Jinping. With stops in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran, the trip illustrates China’s strategy to bridge both sides of the dangerous Shiite-Sunni divide in which America has taken a decidedly Sunni bent. China is the largest trading partner with all three powerful Middle Eastern states (“Xi Jinping’s tour of the Middle East shows China’s growing stake there.” The Economist, 20 Jan. 2016. Web.) Nasr reminds his readers that the world has become far too interconnected to allow us to focus on any particular region at the expense of the rest. To do so would be to apply 20^th century Containment policy on a fluid 21^th century world, no more useful than trying to grab a handful of water.

       It’s unsurprising that Nasr left the Administration embittered. Brought into government on a wave of hope for change and into a State Department led by respected personalities such as Secretary of State Clinton and Ambassador Holbrooke, Nasr expected to be able to achieve what he saw as a triumphant success in American relations with the Middle East. What he found, instead, were the harsh realities of a region and US government pulled apart by various entrenched and opposing interests. Nasr’s very unwillingness to recognize the validity of competing interests in the Administration highlights the desperate need for American leaders, across agencies and the White House staff and throughout both parties, to see that in order to engender compromise and success globally, we must first be willing to reach out with compromise at home.

--Benjamin Spacapan

In the Nation's Service: A Review of Leon Panetta's "Worthy Fights"

Leon Panetta's account of his life, summed up in the aptly titled Worthy Fights, is a self-aware journey from his upbringing in Monterrey, California to his years as Secretary of Defense.  As a former Congressman, Budget Director, and Chief of Staff, Panetta was not an obvious choice for a senior national security role, but his sound analytical thinking and organizational leadership experience made him an excellent choice to head two of the largest and most important organizations in the American government.    As with any memoir, the perspectives in Worthy Fights are colored by personal opinion, and Panetta begins with intimate reflections on his personal life and early years of public service.  He quickly moves to  what will fascinate most readers, spending nearly two-thirds of his autobiography on his recently completed service as Director of the CIA (DCI), followed by appointment as Secretary of Defense.

A loyal former member of the Obama Administration, Panetta initially is quick to defend the President's policy directives, but his frustration with the Executive grows palpably throughout the work.  His disapproval is most clearly illustrated through his discussion of two key foreign policy issues.  Panetta unabashedly criticizes the Congressional leadership for its inability to avoid the sequester, which cut the Defense budget disastrously, and although more reserved in his criticism of the Administration’s handling of the fiasco, he suggest that the President did not lead effectively through the turmoil.  He deflects blame from the President for the friction between the departments and the national security staff, but he bluntly pans the Executive’s role in the withdrawal from Iraq and unwillingness to stand behind its declarations on Syria.  He demonstrates that potentially fixable problems were allowed to spiral out of control due to a lack of strong leadership in either Congress or the White House.  All parties chose politics over the national interest. While the leadership in Congress and the Administration failed to come together on a number of important national security issues, Panetta cautions in stern words that they must work together in the future to avoid the same types of mistakes.  Having served the federal government in both the legislative and executive branches on both sides of aisle, Secretary Panetta is uniquely suited to deliver the critical message that the country is in dire need of bipartisan leadership.

            The CIA served as Panetta’s primer in national security, and his appointment along with those of Secretaries Gates (Defense) and Clinton (State) represent the highlights of the new President’s foreign policy decision making.  Panetta notes that Robert Gates, a holdover at Defense from Bush's administration, represented "an important gesture of continuity" and bi-partisanship and that Hillary Clinton at State was "a luminous representative" and "a smart, forceful advocate in meetings of the president's top advisers" (Ibid.).  These three shared prior personal relationships–Panetta and Gates worked together on the Iraq Study Group, and Panetta is open about his support for Clinton in the presidential primaries (Ibid., Chapter 9). They were also the three figures in the initial Obama Cabinet with the highest profiles before joining the Executive Branch.  Their prominence magnifies their frustration and clashes with the White House.

Panetta's first interactions with Congress as DCI were smooth, with unanimous support for his appointment in the Senate committee (Ibid.).  Ultimately, however,  DCI Panetta describes members of both parties using his trips to the Hill to launch partisan attacks (Ibid).  In one episode, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi cynically denied having been briefed on the use of waterboarding, in effect falsely accusing CIA employees of committing a federal offense (Ibid.).  Though Ms. Pelosi eventually admitted that she had been briefed, her actions constitute a dangerous trend of politicization in national defense.

            Congress was not the only source of trouble from within the government for Panetta during his time as DCI.  When the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created by Congress, roles and responsibilities were not adequately divided between the DCI and DNI.  As a result, Panetta recounts DNI Denny Blair’s public attempts to appoint CIA Station Chiefs (Ibid.).  When Panetta balked at the move, Blair presented him with a fait accompli, “ignored [Panetta’s] request and that same day signed the new policy, which was forwarded to the field staff that evening” (Ibid.).  Panetta countermanded the order, but the fact that the conflict aired in front of the entire agency was a dangerous diversion of attention and resources from the business of national defense.  Further, Panetta writes that Blair refused to accept a decision by Biden arbitrating the issue, and tried to bypass him by going to the President (Ibid.).  That this kind of insubordination and infighting was allowed to continue in the Administration raises concerning questions about the resoluteness of the national security leadership.  Panetta is unable to hide his disdain for Blair and for the position of DNI.  In so doing, he discounts the obvious need for better communication and coordination between the nation’s intelligence organizations, the purpose for which DNI was created.   Despite his obvious feelings on the structure of the intelligence community, Panetta’s coverage of his time in the Obama White House serves as a call for better coordination and communication across the national security leadership.

            To this end, Panetta recounts that NSC chief of staff John McDonough and Tom Donilon did not allow Panetta, Gates, or other senior cabinet members to speak to the media or Congress.  He writes that their actions were “an overreaction that deprived the White House of some of its more capable public spokesmen” (Ibid.).  Panetta diplomatically notes that because David Axelrod and David Plouffe, top White House political consultants, were therefore the most regular representatives of the Administration, “their highly visible role had the effect of overemphasizing the political side of important policy decisions” (Ibid.).  Panetta leaves unsaid the implication that the reason political consultants so often delivered the President’s decisions was perhaps because they had the central role in setting policy.

            Panetta loses his diplomatic tone when describing the Administration and Congress becomes during the run-up to the sequester.  Panetta initially almost apologetically describes the defense cut agreed to by the President, $487 billion over a decade, admitting that the Department “could endure those cuts for a few years, but after a while the fat would be gone and we’d be gouging into muscle” (Ibid., Chapter 15).  Beyond the planned cuts, Panetta describes the Congressional ‘Super Committee’s’ inability to find $1 trillion in further government cuts to avoid a self-imposed sequester. This cut another $500 billion from the defense budget over the decade, which he characterizes as “stunning, a return to the goofy, meat-axe approach” of the 1980s (Ibid.).  Panetta further lambasted the leadership, writing, “I was struck in those sessions by the absence of serious leadership in either chamber.” (Ibid.) 

With the onset of the sequester, Panetta dispenses with his apologies for the Administration, writing that he was not encouraged to pursue an offer of $100 billion in further cuts to the Super Committee because White House strategists were worried he would cut a separate deal to spare defense. He continued that other cabinet members largely refused to enter the budget debate despite impending cuts.  Panetta recounts that it was “symptomatic of what I regarded as a problem with President Obama’s use of his cabinet,” that “President Obama’s decision-making apparatus was centralized in the White House” (Ibid.).  He continues, it had “the effect of reducing the importance of the cabinet members who actually oversaw the agencies,” and that “neither Congress nor the public got the benefit of their insights into what was about to transpire” because “[the Cabinet] waited for permission to object.  It never came” (Ibid.).  That these cuts could have been allowed to go into effect truly is shocking, made all the more so by the lack of leadership for compromise exhibited in dealing with the problem during the months when disaster could have been averted.

Panetta writes of the Super Committee, “Having put the gun to its own head and loaded it up, Congress decided to fire it” (Ibid.).  His unabashed criticism of all those involved with the debacle provides insightful commentary on an issue which has been clouded in politicization stemming from statements of the same leaders who were more concerned with the politics of the Sequester’s aftermath than its actual occurrence.  Panetta implies the episode has become emblematic of an inability or unwillingness to work together in Congress and the White House, and is an important warning for the damage threatened by continued intransigence on all sides.

The most prominent and biting criticism of our leaders emerges from Panetta’s account of the withdrawal of troops from Iraq.  He describes the even more pronounced political leadership problems in Iraq, where political gain and sectarianism among the ruling elite was endemic under Prime Minister Maliki.  The Secretary writes that after years at war, “withdrawing our forces would endanger the fragile stability then barely holding Iraq together.”  Sounding similar to America’s elected officials, “Privately, the various leadership factions in Iraq all confided that they wanted some U.S. forces to remain as a bulwark against sectarian violence.  But none were willing to take that position publicly” (Ibid.).  Despite this position from Iraqi leaders, Panetta insists “We had leverage,” and he “privately and publicly advocated leaving behind a residual force that could provide training and security for Iraq’s military” with the support of U.S. senior military officers (Ibid.).  Sadly, his counsel and publicity campaign were in vain. 

Dropping his diplomatic tone, Panetta writes, “the White House as so eager to rid itself of Iraq that it was willing to withdraw rather than lock in arrangements that would preserve our influence and interests” (Ibid.).  He admits, “To my frustration, the White House coordinated the negotiations [to maintain a residual force in Iraq] but never really led them,” and “without the President’s active advocacy, Maliki was allowed to slip away” (Ibid.). Panetta wrote, “After all we have done to decimate Al Qaeda’s senior leadership and its core, those efforts will be for naught if we allow it to rebuild a base of operations in the Middle East” (Ibid.).  He was so embittered by the American withdrawal from Iraq that he closes his discussion of the issue on a noticeably sarcastic note.  He quotes his comments to a soldier at the final US base closure, “We may be ending the war, but we are not walking away from our responsibilities,” and follows his quote with, “That was an expression of hope rather than fact” (Ibid.).  One can hardly disagree with the sentiment, especially in light of the current ISIS occupation of swathes of that country, but the flippant remark from a former American Secretary of Defense on a war which cost the nation billions of dollars and, more importantly, thousands of lives is disappointing.

            Despite this raw criticism, Panetta recovers a diplomatic tone in his conclusion, where he astutely summarizes the major issues of his public life.  He highlights his greatest disappointments, including the failure of the government to avoid the sequester and the abrupt and mistaken withdrawal from Iraq.  Panetta underscores the problems in Congress, placing somewhat less emphasis on commensurate issues in the White House.  He writes of the Congress, “Elected to help their country, they willfully and deliberately hurt it. (Ibid., Chapter 17).  Of Obama, he says “Too often, in my view, the President relies on the logic of a law professor rather than the passion of a leader” (Ibid.).  Panetta saves his most stinging criticism for the White House’s lack of defined response to the use of chemical weapons during the Syrian Civil War:

“The result, I felt, was a blow to American credibility.  When the president as commander in chief draws a red line, it is critical that he act if the line is crossed.  The power of the United States rests on its word, and clear signals are important both to deter adventurism and to reassure allies that we can be counted on.  Assad’s actions clearly defied President Obama’s warning; by failing to respond, it sent the wrong message to the world” (Ibid.).

In the epilogue to his memoirs, Panetta writes, “my time in government has let me witness the possibilities of effective leadership and the consequences of failure” (Ibid., Epilogue).  Panetta’s memoirs transform readers into co-witnesses, wrapping anecdotes and judgements on the American government and its characters in entertaining stories that effortlessly keep the reader’s attention.  Just underneath the veneer of a storyteller is a clear-eyed appraisal which measures the current members of Congress and the Executive Branch against those he encountered earlier in his career and, by and large, finds them lacking, unwilling to take short-term political risks in the name of long-term national interest.  Because he accomplishes this through stories which render the conclusion obvious to the reader, Panetta’s tone is disappointed rather than bitter.  In a world in which embittered tell-all’s have become the norm, Secretary Panetta reminds us the value of allowing the reader to come to his or her own conclusion based on a balanced and insightful rendition of facts.

 

--By Benjamin Spacapan