Sunday, November 15, 2015

IS Likely to Increase Attempts to Raid and Control Three Specific Roads



Proper logistical and strategic planning are absolutely vital in warfare, especially in a conflict where a belligerent has limited resources.


The massive volume of FSA/Islamists forces engaging the SAA/allies in Northern Hama and the Ghab plain has required large numbers of SAA/allied reinforcements to be dispatched to those areas. The RuAF has been occupied disproportionately with this front, as compared to all other ongoing SAA/allied efforts (ex: Palmyra, Aleppo).


Controlling infrastructure is not as exciting or symbolic as capturing a population center or military facility. However, it is often of much higher value. Controlling highways allows for the transportation of manpower and equipment and the evacuation of wounded at an accelerated rate. It also prevents the enemy from the same benefits, and can also isolate pockets of militants behind newly established front lines.


Specific to the IS: there exists several highways, currently held by SAA/allied forces, which are close to IS front lines. These include Khanasir to al-Ithriyah, al-Ithriyah to Sabburah, and Furqlus to Palmyra.


Controlling these stretches of highways serves another purpose: linking three important areas of IS operations (Raqqa, Palmyra, and Eastern Homs). Controlling these transportation lanes would improve the ability of the IS to fluidly transfer men and equipment to the most active front quickly.


The additional benefit is a force multiplier. Although the IS fights the FSA and Islamist groups as frequently as the SAA/allies, the IS has an interest in causing both sides to lose men and equipment. A way to accelerate this phenomenon is to encourage conditions to foment the already existing conflict between the FSA/Islamists and the SAA/allies. By cutting the aforementioned highways, IS would isolate large pockets of SAA/allied territory from each other (Aleppo separated from Hama, Homs from Palmyra) and further escalate the danger and difficulty of traveling from Homs to Hama. If SAA/allied reinforcements are slower to reinforce SAA/allied positions, the FSA/Islamists have a higher chance of success at any engagement. As such, those groups are more likely to instigate wider and more frequent attacks. This causes casualties and equipment loss to both groups; consequently reducing the assets either can use against IS units both immediately and in the future.


This tactic is also useful in limiting the RuAF power in the conflict. A raiding operation, designed to destroy a checkpoint and install IEDs, can be successful without requiring a concentration of men and equipment, unlike an assault on a defended town or large military installation. As such, Syrian airpower and especially Russian close-air-support are much less effective against small, loosely concentrated guerilla-like forces. Given the SAA/allied large advantage from air superiority, the IS is most likely to adopt new tactics designed at limiting their enemies relative military advantages.


We have already seen the IS disrupt the Khanasir to al-Ithriyah highway with recent raids. This resulted in the IS capturing equipment, killing SAA fighters, and closing that highway temporarily. That one offensive alone was reported to have hampered food supplies to Aleppo city and demanded immediate attention of the SAA. The SAA had to divert manpower to reestablish control and clear IEDs, which reduced the amount of fighters who could have been able to join the SAA/allied offensive against the FSA/Islamists in the South Western Aleppo countryside.


We also know this is an increasingly common technique in the conflict. The IS recently(ish) seized Qaryatayn, a crossroad population center which connected Damascus to Palmyra. They very recently assaulted Sadad, a mostly empty town. The Sadad attack was not ordered for a tactical reason, to inflict casualties or establish a remote salient, but instead was a strategic choice to attempt to close one of the Damascus to Homs highways.


We have also seen this occur on smaller scales by other forces. Jays al-Islam's recent offensive put a large priority in cutting the highway adjacent to the Eastern Ghouta pocket. Again, the highway served as a major artery from Damascus to Homs. Jays al-Islam has prioritized defending this highway over continuing its assault on military/government strongholds, such as Brigade 39, the adjacent armored vehicle base, and the Adra prison.


Many Kurdish groups, likely with the assistance of Western military/intelligence planning, have also implemented this strategy with some success against the IS. Al-Shaddadi is connected to Mosul on a singular stretch of highway which passes through both Sinjar and Tal Afar. Kurdish groups have focused on controlling the highway on either side of Sinjar before the eventual assault on the city.


Consequently, I believe the IS will soon adopt a more conscious and concerted effort in raiding and controlling these areas. The direct and indirect benefits that disruption and/or control over these logistical assets appears to have the highest benefit to risk payoff available to the IS at this time.

--Jeff Chester

Friday, October 9, 2015

The Danger of Inaction



 

     Americans are tired of conflict in the Middle East. From Afghanistan to Iraq, US servicemen and women have given their lives for what many contend are confused goals and unsatisfactory results. It would be comfortable to believe America should pull back from the region. With the Iranian nuclear weapons deal promising a temporary reprieve from the prospect of an Iranian bomb, some argue America should pat itself on the back and come home. But experts suggest that the consequences of American inaction in the Middle East would be grave.

     Afghan troops continue the two steps forward, two steps back battle for control that critics say plagued America’s own efforts in Afghanistan. After losing the key city of Kunduz, Afghan special forces successfully counterattacked, driving out Taliban fighters and reestablishing control. Even still, critics point out that trading control of cities in violent battles is hardly a promising way to rebuild a nation.

On a deeper level, as long as Taliban fighters continue to be supported by certain elements within Pakistan, some experts believe there will be little chance for an end to the conflict that does not involve diplomacy. They argue the last several years have proven that treating Pakistan as an adversary, rather than a friend, does little to improve the situation for America. The natural reaction to double dealing is to pull away from the table, but they contend that relations with the Middle East are far too complicated to be taken at face value.

Because some power brokers in Pakistan see the region through the lens of Pakistan’s conflict with India, experts argue that these power brokers see the Taliban as providing Pakistan with strategic depth, preventing an Afghan agreement with India. Without some reassurance that the pro-Western government in Kabul will cooperate with Pakistan and not serve as a base for India “behind Pakistani lines,” experts question what strategic reason those within Pakistan who currently support the Taliban would have to change course. If the Taliban and other extremists’ attacks on Pakistani cities did not force those elements of the Pakistani establishment supporting them to stop, they question how one can expect American pressure to solve the issue.

While it’s tough to accept that part of an ally’s military and intelligence services support America’s enemies, these experts argue that it’s far harder to fight a war when the nation with the largest potential to help the American cause is treated as a rival. Without Pakistani intelligence to assist in targeting the American drone campaign and Pakistani road links from the coast to the Afghan border, the American endeavor in Afghanistan would be virtually impossible. At the same time, experts insist America cannot abandon the region. They point to the early 1990’s, when the victory of the American-backed Mujahedeen over the Soviets led to years of civil war ending in Taliban control.

Afghanistan backslid into religious extremism, serving as a base for terrorists who orchestrated attacks on Americans around the globe. Most recently, American planes tragically bombed a MSF hospital in Kunduz after being called in by Afghan forces. In the face of repeated setbacks, critics of the administration’s continued push for American withdrawal, liken the situation to a repeat of the failed “endgame” in Iraq.

            Other critics argue Iraq and Syria are perfect illustrations of the dangers posed by an American decision to abandon the Middle East. After years of bloody conflict in Iraq, American troops pulled out despite the protests of successive Secretaries of Defense and the bulk of the military establishment. Islamic State fanatics, many of whose leaders were hardened veterans of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s losing battle with American and Iraqi forces, built a power base in Syria. After years of bloody conflict in Syria and an American “red line,” warning the Assad regime against the use of chemical weapons, critics assert that the US failed to respond effectively when that line was crossed. ISIS flourished as American attempts to train secular fighters floundered. Only a few years after US troops left Iraq, ISIS fighters poured across the border, causing whole Iraqi divisions, trained and armed by America, to desert.

No one can know whether Iraqi troops would have fought with greater resolve if 5,000 to 10,000 American troops were stationed on bases behind them, serving as a strategic reserve in case of catastrophe. Critics of US policy argue, however, that the situation today is far more dangerous because of the lack of a coherent Western response. Hundreds of US advisors currently serve in close proximity to Iranian troops and aligned Shiite militias, which critics characterize as sometimes begrudging allies but often bitter rivals of the American-advised Iraqi Army.
In Iraq and Syria, American-led coalitions are conducting a bombing campaign that these critics suggest lacks the necessary resources to fulfill its mission. Iraq, meanwhile, recently signed an agreement with the Iranians, the Russians, and Assad to fight Islamic State. Iraqi President Abadi was quoted as saying the American-led coalition has been “a small help,” before quickly following up, “This doesn’t mean that I reject small help. Even one single bomb would be helpful to me.” Similarly, critics assert that the Russian bombing campaign targeting US-supported moderate Syrian rebels is the result of drastic reduction in American prestige in the region. Either way, Russian jets are currently conducting combat operations in the Middle East for the first time since Soviet armor retreated from Afghanistan across the Friendship Bridge over 25 years ago. As one senior Turkish official said, “The Americans color-coded; The Russians invaded.”

--Benjamin Spacapan

Thursday, September 24, 2015

Bridging the Ignorance Gap: John Esposito's "Islam: The Straight Path"




Given advances in transportation and communication in the modern age, the cultures of the globe have come into closer contact than ever before.  Peoples who belong to cultures separated by tens of thousands of miles apart can interact in seconds, and peoples belonging to a myriad of cultures mix in the world’s great metropolises, able to easily travel across oceans in a matter of hours.  People in the far corners of the globe are no longer sheltered by distance, forced to interact on a daily basis with many who come from different backgrounds and experiences than their own.  Here in the United States, we have not lived up to the principles o of tolerance upon which this nation was founded.

            In the last year, we have dealt with great strife between different groups within traditional Western Judeo-Christian culture.  However, for the last fourteen years, we have dealt with another problem, one which has been largely ignored by the mainstream media and American society.  President Obama’s recent comments affirming that America is not at war with Islam should be a wake-up call to Americans.  As a nation which has been built through the immigration of peoples from all parts of the world, Americans should not need their President to reiterate that we are not at war with an entire religion.

            Unfortunately, most Americans are both ignorant of Islam and have misinterpreted what little they know to mean that, at best, Judeo-Christian Americans and Muslims, both American and foreign, cannot coexist.  At worst, they are hostile towards Muslims both at home and abroad.  Clearly, this is partly the result of political fear mongering, as politicians use the spectre of militant Islam to remind their constituents that they are the stronger candidate when it comes to foreign policy or defense.  More generally, it is the result of a woeful misunderstanding of Islam and Muslims on the part of Americans.

            John Esposito’s Islam: The Straight Path is an important introduction for Americans who would like to bridge that dangerous gap in understanding.  Esposito takes readers from the Muhammad and the establishment of Islam in the 7th Century Arabian Peninsula to the state of global Islam today.  Rather than using a traditional chronological structure, Esposito has built the book around a collection of the important themes in the history of Islam.  Esposito begins by explaining the beginnings of Islam with Muhammad, providing the context and the story of the establishment of the religion.

            Esposito does not shy away from pointing out the major differences between the story of the establishment of Islam and those of the two major American religions, particularly the political and military nature of early Islam, two components that were not as pronounced in early Christianity or Judaism, he uses the text of the Quran itself to stress that in many ways, Islam’s Allah is more forgiving than God in the Bible.  Esposito explains that in the Quran, after Adam ate of the apple in the Garden of Eden in the Quran, “God extends to Adam His mercy and guidance: ‘But his Lord chose him.  He turned to him and gave him guidance’” (Esposito, 30).  Throughout his text, Esposito stresses the forgiving nature of Islam, and the misinterpretations that underlie the militant extremism today.

            Most importantly, Esposito provides an overview of Islam in the world today, the state of the Islamic world, and the origins of militant Islam.  The first step to understanding how to counter militant Islam is understanding its origins.  In ‘The Struggle for Islam in the Twenty-First Century,’ Esposito lays out the current climate of Islam.  He focuses not only on terrorism as a key point of contention in Islam, but also on Sharia reform and the necessity for Islamic law to modernize to match the circumstances of the modern world, on the role of democracy in Islam, on the rights of Muslim women and the push for the reclamation of those rights, and on the treatment of non-Muslim minorities in the Muslim world.

            The focus on non-Muslim minorities is particularly poignant as Coptic Christians and Azeris have become targets of Muslim extremists in Libya and of Islamic State in Iraq.  This follows hand-in-hand with the rise of terrorism.  As terrorists ignore the true nature of Islam to mold it to their own violent aims, so they ignore the tolerant and conciliatory tone of the Quran to lead in the persecution of non-Muslim minorities, much the same as when they target all those who do not follow or bow to their skewed perception of Islam.

            Esposito uses the radicalization of Bin Laden to highlight the origins of global Jihad.  Many Americans do not consider how our actions will be perceived in the world, and Bin Laden’s anti-Western radicalization is an important example.  Esposito writes,



“Bin Laden became alienated from the House of Saud and radicalized by the prospect that an American-led coalition coming to oust Saddam Hussein from his occupation of Kuwait in the Gulf War of 1991 would lead to the increased presence and influence of America in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.  Bin Laden and others like him are driven by political and economic grievances but draw on a tradition of religious extremism, past and present, to religiously justify and legitimate their path of violence and warfare” (Esposito, 240). 



He also explains that many Muslims initially turned to extremist Islam after they felt abandoned by political leaders, many (but not all) of whom are autocratic, corrupt, unwilling or unable to provide opportunities for the advancement of their people, and propped up by the West.  While most Americans, as well as many Muslims, saw the U.S. and its coalition partners as doing a great service to the peoples of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait by driving the Iraqi army off the Saudi border and out of Kuwait, they did not consider how American troops in the land of Islam’s most holy cities would be perceived by more extreme elements in the Muslim world.  Similarly, Americans must consider the perception of our actions among peoples who do not share our worldview as we navigate the challenging environment in the Middle East today.

            While Esposito’s account of Islam is a useful introduction for many who are largely unfamiliar with one of the world’s largest global religions, he does pay only cursory attention to one of the more important episode of Christian-Muslim interaction in history.  Esposito spends only a few pages discussing the Crusades, when Christian armies invaded the Holy Land and massacred thousands of its Muslim, Jewish, and Christian inhabitants.  Esposito writes,



“The contrast between the behavior of the Christian and Muslim armies in the First Crusade has been etched deeply in the collective memory of Muslims.  In 1099, the Crusaders stormed Jerusalem and established Christian sovereignty over the Holy Land.  They left no Muslim survivors; women and children were massacred.  The Noble Sanctuary, the Haram al-Sharif, was desecrated as the Dome of the Rock was converted into a church and the al-Aqsa mosque, renamed the Temple of Solomon, became a residence for the king...In 1187, Salah al-Din (Saladin)...led his army in a fierce battle and recaptured Jerusalem...Civilians were spared; churches and shrines were generally left untouched.  The striking differences in military conduct were epitomized by the two dominant figures of the Crusades: Saladin and Richard the Lion-Hearted.  The chivalrous Saladin was faithful to his word and compassionate toward noncombatants.  Richard accepted the surrender of Acre and then proceeded to massacre all its inhabitants, including women and children, despite promises to the contrary” (Esposito, 64-65).



Those in the United States who claim that terrorism shows Islam to be an inherently brutal religion, and that Christianity and Judaism could never inspire the violence and injustice exhibited by modern Muslim terrorism, would do well to remember Christians’ actions throughout the Crusades.  Esposito does briefly touch on this period, but makes an error in not spending more time exploring the importance of this period, its impact on Christian-Muslim relations, and implications for Western policy in the Middle East today (the Crusades often play a role in extremist Muslim rhetoric).

            Islam: the Straight Path, is a useful introduction to Islam.  It is written from the perspective of a Western academic, one which Americans can understand and with which we can relate, but it includes the insights of one who is deeply familiar with the Quran and the cultures, histories, and peoples of the Muslim world.  Hopefully, more Americans will read this book and others like it in order to begin to bridge the gap of ignorance between us and our Muslim neighbors, both here in the United States and across the globe.

--Benjamin Spacapan

Thursday, September 17, 2015

Turkish Elections 2015: What has changed since the Gezi Park Protests of summer ’13?



The Turkish parliamentary democracy is at a defining juncture in its history as Kurdish and secular political parties struggle to form a coalition with or against, the ruling AK party. If they fail to do so, a snap-back election will undoubtedly return the AKP to power and serve as a mandate for Erdogan’s agenda of stricter Islamic-focused social policy, consolidated control over the military and expanded Presidential authority.  Elections are already scheduled for November 1st.
One vehicle through which to understand Turkish internal politics in the last few years is through an analysis of the Gezi Park protest movement of 2013. Kurdish and secular parties were acutely aware of the demands of the some 3.5 million Turks that took to the streets two years ago and have utilized this lesson to cut into the AKP’s power. None the less, deep-seated division between secular, Kemalist and Kurdish parties will allow Erdogan to continue Turkey on a course toward totalitarian rule and prevent dissenting parties from cementing democratic principles in the Turkish constitution.
On May 28, 2013, protests erupted in the vibrant Istanbul neighborhood of Taxsim Square. Protests began as an environmental response to Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s plan to build a shopping mall on Gezi Park, the last green space in Istanbul’s posh central shopping district. However, as the calendar flipped to June, initial protests that responded to an environmental injustice blossomed across Turkey’s major cities into a collage of underrepresented political groups, most notably Kurds, Unionists, socialists, Kemalists, Armenians and Islamists. Each group called for change to an Erdogan era of democracy characterized by shrewd control over media, military leadership, political rivals and religious expression. However, polling conveys that real power did not shift at all for almost 2 years, until last month’s election.
At the time of the protest movement 25 months ago, Turkish real unemployment hovered around 15 percent (14.7). This rate contrasts with Turkish government issued data that claims real unemployment floats around 9 percent and only as a result of an expanding workforce. The median household income in Turkey sits at $15,800 U.S. with expanding income disparity over the previous decade. This is roughly 40 percent of the median household income in the U.S. while the CPI (effective measure of cost of living) is only slightly less than that of the United States. Many analysts see this disparity as a root of unrest. While Turkey’s economy has thrived relative to its neighbors, the underclasses have seen the rich get exponentially richer under Erdogan’s government, despite his populist tone.
As of spring 2015, Turkish government statistics place Turkish real unemployment at between 11% and 12%, showing a small uptick from its summer 2013 levels. Additionally, median household income improved dramatically to $18,000 US dollars. Despite these positive signs, Turkish policy makers are quietly worried about rising inflation and noticeable increases in CPI. To be clearer, the Turkish economy has seen marginal growth at best in the two years since the Gezi Park protest movement and little change in economic policy from Erdogan and AKP leadership.
In addition to economic policy, Erdogan worked to create religiosity through restrictive laws on abortion, birth control as well as restrictions on Internet freedom. Between Erdogan’s 2009 election win and the 2013 protests over 20% of Turkey’s existing generals were jailed for plots against the government. AKP dominance has led many political scientists to refer to Turkey as a single party democracy. One leaked U.S. cable revealed: “Erdogan reads minimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press […] instead he relies on his charisma, instincts and the filtering of advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the Web or who are lost in neo-Ottoman fantasies.” Erdogan’s arrogance added fuel to the flames of protests. At times, he referred to the protestors as “Terrorists”, “external forces” or even “Jews”. This out of touch attitude brought millions of Turks to the streets in 2013 and now the polls in 2015 to vote against his increasingly authoritarian agenda.
Erdogan carried 49.95% of the vote in 2009, an unprecedented number in Turkey’s parliamentary system. Analysts see the protests as a conglomeration of the 50.05% of voters that did not support Erdogan. These factions lacked clear voices or demands to unite their cause and show a strong alternative to the AKP. Subsequent polls in 2013 showed little improvement for these parties after protests quelled.
Most observers of the unrest in Turkey are surprised to find that the moderate Kurdish party, HDP, and the violent Kurdish separatist group, PKK, had little influence on 2013 demonstrations. It was a Kurdish HDP member of parliament that started the demonstrations when he spoke out about the plan to turn Gezi Park into a shopping mall. In 2010, the PKK suicide bombed Taxsim Square, the same park where demonstrations were churning 24 months ago. However, many of the PKK’s guerrilla fighting groups have agreed to leave Turkey in recent years for settlements in Kurdish Northern Iraq. While Kurdish leaders have expressed sympathy for demonstrators, the risk of breaking the peace agreement with Erdogan is the likely cause of the Kurdish absence. Kurds represent roughly 20 percent of Turkey’s population. Most of Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia region is comprised of Kurds, though millions of Kurds do live in the western urban centers of Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. With the migration of more PKK fighters to Iraq with the rise of ISIS, Kurdish political parties became more appealing to moderates in last two years.
While Erdogan stayed the course and, as Washington Post Kadir Yildirm described it, brandished Koran’s during the 2015 campaign, the HDP quietly built up support among moderate non-Kurdish Turks who were disenfranchised by Erdogan’s increasingly religious fervor. Exit polling and research shows that many moderate Sunnis seem to have supported the Kurdish party as a sort of protest vote against Erdogan and his desire to expand his authority. While Erdogan brandishes his Koran, HDP leadership has competed with the traditionally secular and capitalist CHP party for more creative economic growth strategies.
While the main opposition party to AKP rule, the CHP, maintained its roughly 25% support from urban secularists in Turkey’s western city centers, the HDP passed the 10% vote threshold necessary to enter parliament for the first time in the party’s history. Now they are faced with the task of forming a coalition that either includes the AKP or can represent more than the 41% that voted for the AKP. If they can do so, they will have the power to do away with anti-democratic policies, like the 10% threshold necessary to enter parliament and the imprisonment of Turkey’s secular generals, which have helped the AKP maintain power throughout the 21st century.
            Despite this potential, early indications are that a coalition may not be possible without the AK party. Secular and Nationalist parties like the CHP, who have referred to Kurdish party as terrorists regularly over the last several decades,  are concerned that including a Kurdish party in their coalition will diminish their nationalist brand. As a result, a coalition between the CHP and AK Party seems inevitable. However, this marriage faces many road blocks as well. The staunchly secular and reform minded CHP would demand liberal reforms of a corrupted judiciary, increased individual freedoms, and strengthened bonds with Western allies. Their platform would undeniably work to diminish AK party power in the interest of democracy. An agreement between CHP and AKP on these issues would cement Turkey as a democratic stalwart in arguably the world’s most unstable neighborhood. Failure, could return the AKP to power within several weeks and create a mandate for their slow march toward authoritarian control. 

--John Spacapan