Americans are tired of conflict in the Middle East. From
Afghanistan to Iraq, US servicemen and women have given their lives for what
many contend are confused goals and unsatisfactory results. It would be
comfortable to believe America should pull back from the region. With the
Iranian nuclear weapons deal promising a temporary reprieve from the prospect
of an Iranian bomb, some argue America should pat itself on the back and come
home. But experts suggest that the consequences of American inaction in the
Middle East would be grave.
Afghan
troops continue the two steps forward, two steps back battle for control that critics
say plagued America’s own efforts in Afghanistan. After losing the key city of
Kunduz, Afghan special forces successfully counterattacked, driving out Taliban
fighters and reestablishing control. Even still, critics point out that trading
control of cities in violent battles is hardly a promising way to rebuild a nation.
On a deeper level, as long as
Taliban fighters continue to be supported by certain elements within Pakistan, some
experts believe there will be little chance for an end to the conflict that
does not involve diplomacy. They argue the last several years have proven that
treating Pakistan as an adversary, rather than a friend, does little to improve
the situation for America. The natural reaction to double dealing is to pull
away from the table, but they contend that relations with the Middle East are
far too complicated to be taken at face value.
Because some power brokers in Pakistan
see the region through the lens of Pakistan’s conflict with India, experts
argue that these power brokers see the Taliban as providing Pakistan with
strategic depth, preventing an Afghan agreement with India. Without some
reassurance that the pro-Western government in Kabul will cooperate with
Pakistan and not serve as a base for India “behind Pakistani lines,” experts
question what strategic reason those within Pakistan who currently support the
Taliban would have to change course. If the Taliban and other extremists’
attacks on Pakistani cities did not force those elements of the Pakistani
establishment supporting them to stop, they question how one can expect American
pressure to solve the issue.
While it’s tough to accept that
part of an ally’s military and intelligence services support America’s enemies,
these experts argue that it’s far harder to fight a war when the nation with
the largest potential to help the American cause is treated as a rival. Without
Pakistani intelligence to assist in targeting the American drone campaign and
Pakistani road links from the coast to the Afghan border, the American endeavor
in Afghanistan would be virtually impossible. At the same time, experts insist America
cannot abandon the region. They point to the early 1990’s, when the victory of
the American-backed Mujahedeen over the Soviets led to years of civil war
ending in Taliban control.
Afghanistan backslid into religious
extremism, serving as a base for terrorists who orchestrated attacks on
Americans around the globe. Most recently, American planes tragically bombed a
MSF hospital in Kunduz after being called in by Afghan forces. In the face of repeated
setbacks, critics of the administration’s continued push for American
withdrawal, liken the situation to a repeat of the failed “endgame” in Iraq.
Other
critics argue Iraq and Syria are perfect illustrations of the dangers posed by
an American decision to abandon the Middle East. After years of bloody conflict
in Iraq, American troops pulled out despite the protests of successive
Secretaries of Defense and the bulk of the military establishment. Islamic
State fanatics, many of whose leaders were hardened veterans of Al-Qaeda in
Iraq’s losing battle with American and Iraqi forces, built a power base in
Syria. After years of bloody conflict in Syria and an American “red line,” warning
the Assad regime against the use of chemical weapons, critics assert that the
US failed to respond effectively when that line was crossed. ISIS flourished as
American attempts to train secular fighters floundered. Only a few years after
US troops left Iraq, ISIS fighters poured across the border, causing whole
Iraqi divisions, trained and armed by America, to desert.
No one can know whether Iraqi
troops would have fought with greater resolve if 5,000 to 10,000 American
troops were stationed on bases behind them, serving as a strategic reserve in case
of catastrophe. Critics of US policy argue, however, that the situation today
is far more dangerous because of the lack of a coherent Western response. Hundreds
of US advisors currently serve in close proximity to Iranian troops and aligned
Shiite militias, which critics characterize as sometimes begrudging allies but often
bitter rivals of the American-advised Iraqi Army.
In Iraq and Syria, American-led coalitions are
conducting a bombing campaign that these critics suggest lacks the necessary
resources to fulfill its mission. Iraq, meanwhile, recently signed an agreement
with the Iranians, the Russians, and Assad to fight Islamic State. Iraqi President
Abadi was quoted as saying the American-led coalition has been “a small help,”
before quickly following up, “This doesn’t mean that I reject small help. Even
one single bomb would be helpful to me.” Similarly, critics assert that the Russian
bombing campaign targeting US-supported moderate Syrian rebels is the result of
drastic reduction in American prestige in the region. Either way, Russian jets
are currently conducting combat operations in the Middle East for the first
time since Soviet armor retreated from Afghanistan across the Friendship Bridge
over 25 years ago. As one senior Turkish official said, “The Americans
color-coded; The Russians invaded.”
--Benjamin Spacapan
