The Turkish parliamentary democracy
is at a defining juncture in its history as Kurdish and secular political
parties struggle to form a coalition with or against, the ruling AK party. If
they fail to do so, a snap-back election will undoubtedly return the AKP to
power and serve as a mandate for Erdogan’s agenda of stricter Islamic-focused
social policy, consolidated control over the military and expanded Presidential
authority. Elections are already
scheduled for November 1st.
One vehicle through which to
understand Turkish internal politics in the last few years is through an
analysis of the Gezi Park protest movement of 2013. Kurdish and secular parties
were acutely aware of the demands of the some 3.5 million Turks that took to
the streets two years ago and have utilized this lesson to cut into the AKP’s
power. None the less, deep-seated division between secular, Kemalist and
Kurdish parties will allow Erdogan to continue Turkey on a course toward
totalitarian rule and prevent dissenting parties from cementing democratic
principles in the Turkish constitution.
On May 28, 2013, protests erupted
in the vibrant Istanbul neighborhood of Taxsim Square. Protests began as an
environmental response to Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s plan to build a
shopping mall on Gezi Park, the last green space in Istanbul’s posh central
shopping district. However, as the calendar flipped to June, initial protests
that responded to an environmental injustice blossomed across Turkey’s major
cities into a collage of underrepresented political groups, most notably Kurds,
Unionists, socialists, Kemalists, Armenians and Islamists. Each group called
for change to an Erdogan era of democracy characterized by shrewd control over
media, military leadership, political rivals and religious expression. However,
polling conveys that real power did not shift at all for almost 2 years, until
last month’s election.
At the time of the protest movement
25 months ago, Turkish real unemployment hovered around 15 percent (14.7). This
rate contrasts with Turkish government issued data that claims real
unemployment floats around 9 percent and only as a result of an expanding
workforce. The median household income in Turkey sits at $15,800 U.S. with
expanding income disparity over the previous decade. This is roughly 40 percent
of the median household income in the U.S. while the CPI (effective measure of
cost of living) is only slightly less than that of the United States. Many
analysts see this disparity as a root of unrest. While Turkey’s economy has
thrived relative to its neighbors, the underclasses have seen the rich get
exponentially richer under Erdogan’s government, despite his populist tone.
As of spring 2015, Turkish
government statistics place Turkish real unemployment at between 11% and 12%,
showing a small uptick from its summer 2013 levels. Additionally, median
household income improved dramatically to $18,000 US dollars. Despite these
positive signs, Turkish policy makers are quietly worried about rising
inflation and noticeable increases in CPI. To be clearer, the Turkish economy
has seen marginal growth at best in the two years since the Gezi Park protest
movement and little change in economic policy from Erdogan and AKP leadership.
In addition to economic policy,
Erdogan worked to create religiosity through restrictive laws on abortion,
birth control as well as restrictions on Internet freedom. Between Erdogan’s
2009 election win and the 2013 protests over 20% of Turkey’s existing generals
were jailed for plots against the government. AKP dominance has led many
political scientists to refer to Turkey as a single party democracy. One leaked U.S. cable revealed: “Erdogan
reads minimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press […] instead he relies on his
charisma, instincts and the filtering of advisors who pull conspiracy theories
off the Web or who are lost in neo-Ottoman fantasies.” Erdogan’s arrogance added
fuel to the flames of protests. At times, he referred to the protestors as
“Terrorists”, “external forces” or even “Jews”. This out of touch attitude brought
millions of Turks to the streets in 2013 and now the polls in 2015 to vote against
his increasingly authoritarian agenda.
Erdogan carried 49.95% of the vote in 2009, an unprecedented number in
Turkey’s parliamentary system. Analysts see the protests as a conglomeration of
the 50.05% of voters that did not support Erdogan. These factions lacked clear
voices or demands to unite their cause and show a strong alternative to the AKP.
Subsequent polls in 2013 showed little improvement for these parties after
protests quelled.
Most observers of the unrest in Turkey are surprised to find that the moderate
Kurdish party, HDP, and the violent Kurdish separatist group, PKK, had little
influence on 2013 demonstrations. It was a Kurdish HDP member of parliament
that started the demonstrations when he spoke out about the plan to turn Gezi
Park into a shopping mall. In 2010, the PKK suicide bombed Taxsim Square, the
same park where demonstrations were churning 24 months ago. However, many of
the PKK’s guerrilla fighting groups have agreed to leave Turkey in recent years
for settlements in Kurdish Northern Iraq. While Kurdish leaders have expressed
sympathy for demonstrators, the risk of breaking the peace agreement with
Erdogan is the likely cause of the Kurdish absence. Kurds represent roughly 20
percent of Turkey’s population. Most of Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia region is
comprised of Kurds, though millions of Kurds do live in the western urban
centers of Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. With the migration of more PKK fighters
to Iraq with the rise of ISIS, Kurdish political parties became more appealing
to moderates in last two years.
While Erdogan stayed the course and, as Washington Post Kadir Yildirm
described it, brandished Koran’s during the 2015 campaign, the HDP quietly
built up support among moderate non-Kurdish Turks who were disenfranchised by
Erdogan’s increasingly religious fervor. Exit polling and research shows that
many moderate Sunnis seem to have supported the Kurdish party as a sort of
protest vote against Erdogan and his desire to expand his authority. While
Erdogan brandishes his Koran, HDP leadership has competed with the
traditionally secular and capitalist CHP party for more creative economic
growth strategies.
While the main opposition party to AKP rule, the CHP, maintained its
roughly 25% support from urban secularists in Turkey’s western city centers,
the HDP passed the 10% vote threshold necessary to enter parliament for the
first time in the party’s history. Now they are faced with the task of forming
a coalition that either includes the AKP or can represent more than the 41%
that voted for the AKP. If they can do so, they will have the power to do away
with anti-democratic policies, like the 10% threshold necessary to enter
parliament and the imprisonment of Turkey’s secular generals, which have helped
the AKP maintain power throughout the 21st century.
Despite this
potential, early indications are that a coalition may not be possible without
the AK party. Secular and Nationalist parties like the CHP, who have referred
to Kurdish party as terrorists regularly over the last several decades, are concerned that including a Kurdish party
in their coalition will diminish their nationalist brand. As a result, a
coalition between the CHP and AK Party seems inevitable. However, this marriage
faces many road blocks as well. The staunchly secular and reform minded CHP
would demand liberal reforms of a corrupted judiciary, increased individual
freedoms, and strengthened bonds with Western allies. Their platform would
undeniably work to diminish AK party power in the interest of democracy. An
agreement between CHP and AKP on these issues would cement Turkey as a
democratic stalwart in arguably the world’s most unstable neighborhood.
Failure, could return the AKP to power within several weeks and create a mandate
for their slow march toward authoritarian control.
--John Spacapan
