On the surface, today’s great issues in world affairs are
undoubtedly more nuanced and more complicated than those that Henry Kissinger
faced during the Cold War. As such, one
might be surprised that an “old world” diplomat could present such a prescient view
of the issues at the heart of the US relationship with an ever more aggressive
world. Nonetheless, it is with a sound
view of history that Mr. Kissinger approaches his thesis in World Order. Kissinger brings into focus the most
important factor in modern diplomacy, a firm understanding of the viewpoint and
background of the parties on the other side of the negotiating table. World
Order combines an astute assessment of the modern world with an
encompassing understanding of its historical context and observes that the
Westphalian age has finally passed.
However, his call for a new international order that would bring balance
to the global arena fails to view modern states in the context of their
historical analogues. In reality, the
world has become far too complicated for a static international order, and the
visionary leaders of the future will be most successful if they deal with each
issue in the context of its own environment.
Kissinger
explains that the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War, quite
possibly the most devastating period of conflict faced in European history, set
the stage for the Western conception of national interactions. He is careful to emphasize that foreign
powers do not necessarily buy into this concept. Under the tenets of Westphalia, each nation
works to make sure that no one nation has the ability to overpower the
others. In each era, a major power
served as a counterweight that sided against the most powerful aggressors. In pre-World War Europe, this was England,
while after the war, this was the United States. Further, Kissinger asserts that European
world hegemony, from the rise of Imperialism through the Cold War and governed
for the most part by the Westphalian system, is at an end. He writes, “The universal relevance of the
Westphalian system derived from its procedural—that is,
value-neutral—nature. Its rules were
accessible to any country: non-interference in domestic affairs of other
states; inviolability of borders; sovereignty of states; encouragements of
international law” (Kissinger, 363).
Kissinger continues, “Designed as it [the Westphalian order] was by
states exhausted from their bloodletting, it did not supply a sense of
direction. It dealt with methods of
allocating and preserving power; it gave no answer to the problem of how to
generate legitimacy” (Ibid., 363).
Kissinger surmises that the Westphalian system’s greatest weakness was
that it did not provide legitimacy, but the answer is not, as he suggests, a
new system. Rather, a fluid
international strategy based on pragmatism and an understanding of how
conflicts arose in the past is the best approach for future world leaders.
The World Wars represent two points
in the Westphalian era when the balance of power failed to prevent global
conflagration. In both cases, signs of
impending conflict suggested an environment in which war was likely to occur
regardless of the exact circumstances or leaders involved. In each case, the Anglo-American perspective
paints the Germans as the aggressors.
While this is hardly debatable in the case of the Second World War, the
system of alliances that dragged the world into war in the First leaves more
room for differences of opinion. For the
purposes of a view to the future, the exact circumstances that led to the wars
are less important than the overarching world stage of the time.
Before the onset of WWI, a growing
German Empire sought to claim its seat at the table of world powers. Newly unified Germany spent the late 19th
century becoming one of the premier military and industrial centers of Europe,
collecting colonies, and building ambition.
No longer shackled by partition and infighting in Central Europe,
Germans felt they could, and should, deal with the other major European states
on equal terms. To service the growing
sea-borne trade and overseas colonies of an emerging empire, Germany began to
construct a navy. This brought Germany
into direct conflict with the premier world power of the day, Great Britain,
which relied on its unmatched navy to maintain a position as global arbiter of
power. The British were unwilling to
allow Germany to threaten their position as the premier global naval power, and
Germans felt that the British had no right to check their expansion. While the war that followed was sparked on
the other side of the European continent and Britain did for a time consider
joining the Central Powers, it is likely that war between Germany and Britain
would have occurred if the two states had continued on their path unchecked.
This friction between a dominant
and a growing naval power should sound similar to a current world
situation. Over the last several
decades, China has grown out of the throes of poverty to become the second most
powerful global economy, with a military and ambition to match. China has grown more assertive of its claims
overseas, establishing an air identification zone over disputed islands in the
East China Sea that has brought it into conflict with Japan and undertaking a
massive land reclamation project to create island bases in the South China Sea
in waters whose control it disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia,
Taiwan, and Brunei. In order to support
these claims, China has undertaken a massive buildout of its naval
capabilities, including the development of an aircraft carrier, the
prepositioning of anti-ship cruise missiles along its shores, and a fleet of
short range ships and submarines to project power in the western Pacific. All of these actions run counter to the
interests of the established premier global naval power, the United
States. In fact, the United States has
already flown aircraft through the disputed zones in the East and South China
Seas, flouting Chinese claims, and, according to the Wall Street Journal, is
“weighing whether to deploy Navy vessels or aircraft close to the islands to
signal to China that it can’t close off international waters” (“China to Build
Military Facilities on South China Sea Islets,” 6/16/15). American leaders must understand the lessons
of interactions between the British and Germans almost exactly a century ago
and strive to understand the point of view of the Chinese strategists with whom
they are dealing.
Kissinger describes the Chinese
position as one of two intertwined experiences.
The legacy of the ancient East Asian world order stretched well into the
age of European Imperialism, and still leaves a lasting impression on the
Chinese psyche. According to Kissinger,
traditional Chinese concepts of world order placed China at the center of a
global web with states whose level of civilization diminished as they grew
farther, both geographically and culturally, from the center, which was located
at the heart of the Chinese Empire.
Kissinger writes that Chinese tradition viewed the Emperor as ruler of
“’All under Heaven,’ of which China formed the central, civilized part” (Ibid.,
213). This view of China as the center
of the world was challenged as European imperialists carved out chunks of
China’s coastline and helped to bring about the end of the Chinese dynasty,
which lead to a period of warlordism stretching to the Japanese invasion in the
1930s. After unification of the country
under the communist government, China spent decades struggling to overcome its
unstable past and improve its economy.
After the
economic strides of the last two decades, China can afford to focus on
expanding its global reach. Given the
unique Chinese viewpoint that combines the vestiges of the belief that China
remains the center of the civilized world with the shame and resentment of the
partition of the Chinese coastline by foreign powers, it is unsurprising that
China is unwilling to accede to the demands of its neighbors and their American
protectors and halt its expansion.
Pragmatic American strategists must accommodate Chinese desires for a
larger share of world power and overseas territory while keeping the tension
between China and its neighbors from devolving into war. To China, this expansion is a legitimate
manifestation of the revival of their place at the center of the world, and a
change in the international order wouldn’t affect the Chinese position. In order to maintain the delicate balance,
American strategists must approach Chinese desires with pragmatism rather than
a static conception of an international order.
In Russia, Kissinger describes a
modern state that still feels the paranoid legacy of being surrounded by
enemies. From its decimation by the
Mongol hordes to the first attempts to remold a contiguous empire, Russia’s
major goal was just to survive.
Kissinger describes the Russian outlook as shaped by a series of
cautionary tales, “In Russia’s experience of history, restraints on Power
spelled catastrophe” (Ibid., 52). He
characterizes the Russian view of international relations as "a perpetual
contest of wills, with Russia extending its domain at each phase to the
absolute limit of its material resources" (Ibid.). Kissinger quotes Russian 17th-century
minister Nashchokin, "expanding the state in every direction, and this is
the business of the Department of Foreign Affairs"(Ibid.). In this sense, Russia's concept of world
order was never to favor a balance of power except one with Russia on the
heavier side of the scale.
Similarly
to the Chinese experience, the fall of the dynastic monarchy brought great
change to Russia, but elements of this traditional view of world affairs were
evident in the actions of the Soviet leadership. The fear of being surrounded by one's enemies
governed every aspect of Russian life, both in the creation of the Warsaw Pact,
a buffer zone of puppet states between the USSR and the democratic West, and in
the intrigue and terror perpetrated by the Soviet security services against the
Russian people. Russians were not only
surrounded by potential enemies on their borders, but also in their subways,
places of work, and even apartment buildings.
When the Soviet state finally collapsed under its own weight, continuous
Russian expansion, which had continued in fits and starts for hundreds of
years, fundamentally reversed.
Westerners
are quick to forget that the demise of the Soviet state brought not only a
shift in government and civil society, but also a steep decline in Russia's
stature in the world. Within less than
half a decade, the European countries that had once made up the Warsaw Pact
pulled out of their relationships with Russia and adopted new governments
ranging from true democracies to strongman dictatorships. Most made the decision to align themselves
with the West, and in the two decades that followed many of these countries
joined Western organizations (specifically NATO and the EU) that were initially
founded with the express purpose of containing Russian and communist
expansion. More maddening for Russians
was the breakup of the USSR itself, when a swath of the Soviet periphery
declaring independence and forming new states.
Though Russia has maintained close ties with certain members of the
former USSR, other countries, including the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and
Georgia, have sparred with Russia. While
the Baltic States were quick to join NATO, Georgia and the Ukraine have played
host to bitter struggles between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions over the
succeeding decades.
When one
takes Kissinger's advice, and views the state of the world from the eyes of all
parties, it is unsurprising that Russians view the loss of world power status
with anger and humiliation. Compounded
with the rampant corruption, economic uncertainty, and lack of firm leadership
that were common in the Yeltsin years just after democratization, Russia was
the perfect candidate for authoritarian democracy. To Russians, Vladimir Putin and his comrades
promise strong and decisive action that was so lacking during the Yeltsin
years, and his former position in the KGB does not pose a cautionary tale, as
many Westerners believe, but instead the chance for a return to a world in
which Russian security services and the Russian military are powerful forces on
the world stage.
Slow
revelation of the authoritarian nature of the current regime and economic
stagnation following the drop in oil prices have hurt the standing of the
Russian government domestically. Putin
has responded by relying on his Russian image as an almost mythical pillar of
machismo, reinforced by a resurgence in Russian regional power. Russia has instilled iron control in its
Caucasian provinces, which were once hotbeds of revolt, fought wars Georgia to
create "autonomous zones" that are in effect extensions of Russia,
supported authoritarian leaders in former Soviet states, sparred with the new
NATO members in Eastern Europe and the Baltic, conducted aggressive maneuvers
along the air and seas frontiers with North American and European states,
rattled the nuclear saber, and most recently annexed the Crimea and supported
rebels in neighboring Ukraine. Putin
offers these aggressions to the Russian people as an example of his leadership
returning Russia to its rightful place on the world stage.
Putin’s
Russia is similar to other dangerous situations when leaders beset with
domestic troubles used military aggression to offer the public the potential
for a return from humiliation. In
post-World War I Germany, an ineffectual democracy was unable to control the economic
tailspin brought on at the end of a global power struggle that stripped the
country of much of its power and possessions.
Similarly to post-Cold War Russians, Germans after the WWI felt
humiliated by the demotion of their country from world power status, the loss
of swaths of the German Empire, and the subsequent economic collapse. This vacuum allowed a powerful leader to step
into a position from which he eventually controlled every aspect of the German
state. One cannot understate the horror
of Hitler and the Nazis' actions, nor can one even consider equating recent
Russian aggression or authoritarian tendencies of the Russian government with
the global war and Holocaust brought on by Hitler. However, the environment in which the Nazi
party initially consolidated power in early-1930's Germany is similar to the
situation in Russia over the last two decades.
Further, the string of short, violent conflicts and overt power plays to
extend Russian influence in neighboring states is eerily similar to 1930’s
Germany's remilitarization and expansion.
More concerning is the West's lack of effective responses to stop the
aggression and penchant for, explicit or implicit, appeasement of Russia's
leadership.
If Western
leaders learned something from Chamberlain and his colleagues' experience with
Germany, it seems that those lessons have been forgotten. As Kissinger counsels, Westerners must look
at the world from the eyes of Russia's leaders.
In their view, it is logical to continue to press at the edges of what
the West will allow until they reach a hard point. Russia was strong historically only when it
was expanding. Expansion today provides
a salve for the wounds of the late 1980s and early 1990s and distracts the
Russian people from their eroding civil liberties and economy. Unless the Western states are willing to make
a firm stand-one that involves deeper consequences than sanctions against
private individuals and corporations-there is no logical reason for Russia to
stop. Each time Western leaders accept
the creation of autonomous regions in South Ossetia, the annexation of the
Crimea, the arming and training of rebels in eastern Ukraine, or the violation
of the borders of the Baltic States, Russian actions are validated. In this context, training and material
support for the Ukrainian Army and increases in NATO deployments to the Baltic
States seem much more important, though perhaps even these are not big enough
steps. Regardless of which actions are
taken, Western leaders must acknowledge the lessons of the German absorption of
the Sudetenland and Anschluss with Austria nearly 80 years ago, and stop
aggression while they still can.
Clearly, a
strategy of appeasement with one nation and a strategy of steadfastness in
relation to another appeal to widely differentiated political viewpoints and
theories. No one concept of world order,
as proposed by Kissinger, could hand real legitimacy to both strategies. The world has become so complex, however,
that the problems posed by Chinese and Russian expansion are actually two of
the less complicated issues facing Western leaders. In the world of cyberespionage and cyber
warfare, and the global war on terror, Western leaders face situations that
transcend nearly every historical analogue in terms of complexity.
Kissinger's
conclusion is flawed, but his arguments leading to that conclusion are
brilliantly structured. His appraisal of
the situation in cyberspace is both worrying and spot-on:
"Internet technology has
outstripped strategy or doctrine--at least for the time being. In the new era, capabilities exist for which
there is as yet no common interpretation--or even understanding. Few if any limits exist among those wielding
them to define either explicit or tacit restraints. When individuals of ambiguous affiliation are
capable of undertaking actions of increasing ambition and intrusiveness, the
very definition of state authority may turn ambiguous" (Ibid., 344-345).
It’s clear that Kissinger’s call for a clear agreement
between the world powers regarding the rules of cyberspace is an immediate
necessity, but that does not necessarily have to accompany a general acceptance
of a new world order. While cyberspace
represents a new frontier for which no previous conception of world order could
have planned, many of the concerns in the Middle East are resurfacing and
consolidating in a time of regional instability.
Western
involvement in the Middle East over the past 15 years has increased
substantially as the result of two major American invasions and a global war on
terror. In the wake of the Arab Spring,
regional alignments have shifted. In
Yemen, Saudi and other Arab states allied with the West banded together to
fight Houthi expansion, a Yemeni group which is armed and funded by Iran. America provided support to this coalition,
which not only included Arab states, but also Sudan, which many Western leaders
regard as an enemy in the war on terror.
In Iraq, the invasion and success of radical Islamic State has forced
Iranian and American advisors into close quarters as both parties support
elements fighting Sunni radicals. In
Syria, more moderate rebels who are candidates for Western support and even
certain Arab allies counsel partnerships with Al-Nusra, an Al Qaeda affiliate,
as the lesser of two evils when compared to Islamic State. Finally, the use of drone warfare, which has
been a highly successful tool in fighting terrorism, includes the regular
violation of the airspace and territorial integrity of multiple supposed
Western allies. All of these actions
highlight the fluidity of the Middle East, and the necessity that any party
which hopes to have lasting influence there be flexible enough to handle the
shifting sands in the region.
It is true
that these complexities are not new, and the Middle East provides multiple examples
of past American actions that defied any equitable world order. The Iran-Contra scandal revealed that the
United States armed both sides in the Iran-Iraq War, which took the lives of
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Iranians in the 1980s. Little wonder that Iranian leaders don't
trust the West and sought alternate (and very dangerous) means to ensure their
continued power. What this suggests,
however, is that the Westphalian balance of power, and any real subscription by
Western leaders to a particular set of ideals or standards in international
affairs, may have been dead long before the end of the Cold War. As the global network continues to evolve in
the 21st century, Western leaders must embrace this complexity and eschew any
one "world order."
Kissinger
has failed to provide convincing evidence for the necessity of a new world
order that lends legitimacy to international law, but his work represents a
resounding success in assessing the past and current state of the world. By analyzing key issues in global affairs
through the lens of their historical contexts, he provides the framework for a
discussion on the future of international relations. This is a discussion that has been held in
earnest at least since the end of the Cold War, and with increasing urgency
since September 11, 2001 brought a focus on global terror. One can only hope that Western leaders settle
on a pragmatic approach to the globe.
Rigidity has proven to be the bane of most great powers, and rigidity
now would surely do great damage to the position of the West. Faced with the revanchism of one former world
power and the surge onto the world stage of a future power, the West must
navigate a middle course. Fighting
terrorists around the globe and attempting to restore order in a roiling Middle
East will require Western leaders to make choices with no good option, all of
which fly in the face of Western values, but to do nothing would present a far
greater danger. In cyberspace, the
Western nations are far behind and must develop a framework to respond to the
wide array of attacks and attackers which threaten every day. To attempt to address each of these issues
through one framed world order would be a disservice to Western electorates and
would represent either ignorance of or unwillingness to apply the lessons of
history.
--Benjamin Spacapan
