The Expatriate’s Return: A Review of Former Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren’s Ally

Michael Oren is a renowned historical scholar, famous for his prescient works on the history of the interaction between America and the Middle East, a field for which he is uniquely qualified. In Ally, Oren explores his own life, a much more difficult endeavor for most scholars. Oren’s story spans from his youth in West Orange, New Jersey to his service in the Israeli paratroops and posting as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States. The work is meticulously well written and witty, biting in its criticism and unabashed in its opinions, and serves as an inside look at one of the most important foreign diplomatic postings in the United States.

Despite being forced to give up his U.S. Passport as a foreign diplomat, Ambassador Oren truly is a man of two nations, and this contrast is evident throughout the book. In this capacity, he is well suited to convey not only the points where the Israeli and American governments disagree, but also the subjects on which Israelis and Americans misunderstand each other. Oren’s description of many Israelis’ confusion with the election of President Obama is an important difference between Americans and Israelis, and it’s notable that Oren so openly leans, at least intellectually, to the Israeli perspective. He writes, “[Some Israelis] could not understand why Americans would choose a candidate lacking in any military, administrative, or foreign policy experience” (Oren, p. 43). His flippant but accurate explanation of this difference captures his own ambivalence toward certain aspects of Americans’ decision making: “Americans prefer their presidents to be eloquent, attractive, and preferably strong-jawed. Such qualities, in the life-and-death stakes of Israel, are irrelevant” (Ibid.).

Oren’s distaste for Americans’ leadership showed through like thin strips of daylight in his attempts to remain impartial, particularly in his discussion of trying to understand the President. He writes, “Vainly, I scoured Dreams from My Father for some expression of reverence, even respect, for the country its author would someday lead. Instead, the book criticizes Americans for their capitalism and consumer culture, for despoiling their environment and maintaining antiquated power struggles” (Ibid., 97).

Ambassador Oren also recounts Senator Joe Liebermann brushing aside threats to accuse Oren of interfering in American politics from U.S. Administration advisor David Axelrod as nothing to worry about because, “It’s just Chicago politics” (Ibid., 141). As a scholar who spent most of his career writing non-fiction history, Oren cannot have included these incidents by accident, but rather as calculated reflections of his own feelings toward the American leadership.

Oren’s account of the relative souring of the relationship between the Obama Administration and the Israeli Government exemplifies his greatest challenge in attempting to remain neutral enough to paint a full picture of the situation. Despite his interest in maintaining the image of the U.S. Government as having been the main instigator of this divide, he remarks early in his work that, “Unlike the White House, which is accessible to a range of Israeli officials, the Hill is the Ambassador’s exclusive domain” (Ibid., 84). This point is important because Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech to Congress, focused primarily against the U.S. Administration’s proposed nuclear agreement with Iran and in defiance of the President’s wishes, occurred during Oren’s time as Ambassador.

The key sticking points between Administrations concerned the approach to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and Iranian nuclear buildup, rife with back-room conversations between President Obama and Palestinian PM Abbas or Iranian officials and Netanyahu lectures to Obama in the White House. Neither side of the Alliance’s leadership was able to work together effectively, despite the attempts of Ambassador Oren.

Oren further disagrees with the Administration’s response to the conflict in Syria. He quotes President Obama, “When you have a professional army [the Syrian Army] that is well-armed…fighting against a farmer, a carpenter, an engineer who started out as protestors…the notion that we could have…changed the equation on the ground there [in Syria] was never true” (Ibid., 308). Oren contrasts this statement with the American Revolution, fought by farmers and carpenters against a professional army, and writes that the Syrian episode “revealed the president’s determination to withdraw from the Middle East irrespective of the human price” (Ibid.). When American leadership failed to punish Assad for using chemical weapons, Oren writes, “The entire Middle East, and especially the Iranians, now knew that America would dither before enforcing an ultimatum” (Ibid., 344). Clearly frustrated, Ambassador Oren sums up the situation with a quote from a call he received from Senator John McCain, “This is the most fucked-up thing I’ve seen in my entire political career” (Ibid.).

Oren was unequivocal in his disdain for the Administration’s handling of the nuclear agreement with Iran. The Ambassador describes Obama, Netanyahu, and Iran as Chamberlain, Churchill, and Nazi Germany, “The man who would be Churchill, who once likened Obama’s policies to Roosevelt’s refusal to bomb Auschwitz, was now identifying new Neville Chamberlains seeking to appease, rather than defeat, evil” (Ibid., 372). He writes, “I sensed that the same commander in chief who sought congressional authorization for warlike actions against Syria and the Islamic State would try to side-step the Senate in signing what he portrayed as a peace agreement with Iran” (Ibid., 361).

Ambassador Oren’s insight into what both governments can do to better understand one another and the ways in which Americans’ views have hampered their ability to project influence in the Middle East are more constructive points. When discussing American diplomatic pressure on Israel, Oren wrote, “Unlike in the West, where security is measured in tanks, jets, and guns, security in this part of the world is largely a product of impressions. A friend who stands by his friends on some issues but not others is, in Middle Eastern eyes, not really a friend” (Ibid., 88).

This difference of opinion continued during the Arab Spring, when the U.S. media embraced democratic movements across the region, including in countries ruled by longtime American allies. Ambassador Oren writes, “Such exuberance could not be overlooked by the press-sensitive Obama administration” (Ibid., 199) and allows,

“Flagrantly brutal and corrupt, Mubarak was nevertheless America’s loyal friend for more than thirty years. And after a single week of demonstrations that, though highly publicized, involved a fraction of Egypt’s 85 million inhabitants, the United States abandoned him. That single act of betrayal—as Middle Easterners, even those opposed to Mubarak, saw it—contrasted jarringly with Obama’s earlier refusal to support the Green Revolution against the hostile regime in Iran. Other American allies in the region [read: the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council] took notice. So, too, did America’s foes” (Ibid., 199).

While Oren’s portrayal of the destruction of America’s image in the Middle East is striking, his implication that the current American leadership may have sought to shirk the duties associated with global leadership is much more concerning. He quotes Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger questioning, “What makes you think anybody in the White House still cares about American hegemony in the Middle East?” (Ibid., 94), and almost as if in response, President Obama, “Whether we like it or not, we remain a dominant military superpower” (Ibid., 237). A historian, Oren cannot contain himself from highlighting the differences between this outlook and the stance of former American Presidents whom he identifies as world leaders such as Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton.

In between recounting his years in Washington, which make up the bulk of his memoir, Oren peppers Ally with what he sees as the important intersection between his own field, history, and world leadership. According to Ambassador Oren, “Netanyahu, it turned out, had read my book Power, Faith, and Fantasy and was impressed by my knowledge of America’s history in the Middle East.  He regarded understanding the past as the key to interpreting the present.  That was perhaps the main reason I even merited an interview [for Ambassador]” (Ibid., 57).

Most importantly he shows that rather than any maliciousness on either side, the recent troubles in the new relationship were due to a fundamental lack of understanding. Oren writes that former senior U.S. Administration officials caused the Israeli national security advisor to “blanche” when they suggested that the “Libyan people will always remain grateful for the freedom they received from America” (Ibid., 302). The Ambassador’s implication is that, to the contrary, the ensuing power vacuum in Libya actually allowed radical militant groups including Islamic State to establish a base of power.

Toward the end of his work, Ambassador Oren recounts a distinctly Kissingerian point for which I personally greatly respect the former Secretary of State: the necessity of viewing any international issue not from your own perspective, but from that of the party with whom you are engaging. Oren cautions, “Israeli decision makers must never lose sight of how the Middle East—indeed, the world—looks from Washington” (Ibid., 375).

Above any political grievances between Administrations, Ambassador Oren highlights the special nature of the American-Israeli alliance, which has endured many American Presidents and Israeli Prime Ministers, and will endure many into the future. He writes, “The presence of an American ally at the world’s most strategically crucial crossroads, deploying an army more than twice the size of Britain’s and France’s combined, cannot be undervalued” (Ibid.).

Oren’s point should not be missed, and if anything is taken away from Ally, it should be the absolutely indispensable nature of the American-Israeli alliance. America must keep all its Middle Eastern allies close, particularly the longstanding and insightful Hashemites in Jordan and the powerful, wealthy, and independent monarchs of the Gulf, but these alliances are neither as deep nor as close as the American alliance with Israel.

Equally important, Oren highlights the value of American strength to Israel and American allies more broadly. Sounding similar to scholar Vali Nasr, with whom Oren would almost definitely disagree on many foreign policy points, the Ambassador highlights the long-term importance of the Middle East to America: “Just as Israel benefits from a strong America—an America viewed as strong from Ukraine to the South China Sea—so, too, does the United States gain from a secure and powerful Israel. For all the talk about ‘pivoting to Asia,’ the United States will remain inextricably linked to the Middle East, for it will follow them home” (Ibid., 376).

THIS ARTICLE IS ALSO POSTED TO MY SPANKING NEW BLOG AT arrowsandolivebranchesblog.wordpress.com! SAME ARTICLES, SAME NAME, SAME BLATHERING, PRETTIER BACKDROP!

-- By Benjamin Spacapan

The Unapologetic Diplomat: A Review of Vali Nasr’s "The Dispensable Nation"

 

Diplomats are typically known for couching their aims and opinions in even, inoffensive terms designed to convey meaning without alienating. Mr. Nasr, a former high-ranking diplomat in Richard Holbrooke’s AfPak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) group within the State Department, has dispensed with this approach in his memoirs, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat. Mr. Nasr appears to find it difficult to hide his bitterness with what he purports to be a major failure on the part of the Administration, particularly when it comes to Middle Eastern policy. Nasr writes that continued sanctions against Iran and a general reluctance, verging on refusal, to engage the Iranian regime on Afghanistan was a serious failure by the Administration, “which showed a lack of imagination in managing both those challenges” (Nasr, Location 934). Nasr’s work contrasts starkly with the recent works of Secretaries Panetta and Gates. One of the most positive characteristics of Gates and Panetta’s works was their tendency to refrain from passing judgement on the Administration. Their criticism of the Executive largely came in questioning the consolidation of power among a few members of the National Security Staff. In a world full of pundits who seek to color history with their own lenses, both Secretaries wrote books which laid out their version of the facts without excessive spin. While one can feel their patience wear increasingly thin as they recount the sequence of events during their time in office, both of their works start out positively, whereas Mr. Nasr’s disappointment is palpable from the beginning of The Dispensable Nation.

      Nasr asserts that the military was allowed to run rampant by an administration too timid to control it. In regard to the American decision to sever close ties with Pakistan after years of rocky relations, Nasr writes,” Ours was not just an empty bluff, it was worse than that—it was folly we believed in and crafted out policy on, and all Pakistan had to do was wait for reality to set in…We did not have to break the relationship and put Pakistan’s stability at risk…We have not realized our immediate security goals there and have put our long-run strategic interests in jeopardy. Pakistan is a failure of American policy, a failure of the sort that comes from the president handing foreign policy over to the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies” (Ibid., Location 1612). Gates and Panetta, alternatively, both felt that the Administration hamstrung the military and failed in Iraq by allowing relations to deteriorate to a point when US troops withdrew from the country altogether. The Secretaries largely refrain from sweeping language, with the exception of their horror at what they characterize as an American abandonment of our duty in Iraq. Nasr is clearly a gifted academic and diplomat, but his broad stroke denunciations of the Administration’s decisions do at times, feel less like careful consideration of all aspects of policy affecting a decision and more an embittered complaint that his team’s specific aims were not achieved. It’s hard to shake the feeling that Nasr is not-so-subtlety arguing that the Administrations problems could have been solved had they just listened to Nasr and Holbrooke’s team.

Partially as a result of this, the work is certainly less fulfilling than those of Gates and Panetta. Because Nasr chooses to be so clearly biased in certain places, one is tempted to question objective analysis throughout the rest of the work. However, as a critique of the national security and foreign policy team in the White House, Nasr’s piece is valuable in that it highlights the deeply divided stances of at least some members of the diplomatic apparatus and the defense department. Similarly to the Defense Secretaries, he critiques the Administration for centralizing too much of the decision making, but he disagrees with those decisions for almost directly opposing reasons from the leaders of Defense. Where they feel the Administration has not gone far enough, Nasr argues it went too far, and vice versa. Importantly, his work contrasts with those of Gates and Panetta to show that the Administration took something of a middle road in its decision making between State and Defense. By looking at criticism from both sides, we find that perhaps the Administration was not ignoring its advisors as much as trying to find a way to mediate a series of heated debates.

      Though clearly flawed in certain ways, Nasr’s work is an insightful critique of American policy and provides an interesting warning regarding President Obama’s stated policy to pivot away from the Middle East and toward the Pacific. He cogently argues that if America does seek to counter the growth of Chinese influence globally, it is important to do this not only in East Asia but also in those areas of the world where Chinese influence is quickly increasing. In particular, he notes that if Chinese influence on the Gulf Monarchies were to continue to grow unchecked, as it has in Pakistan and Africa, “Chinese interest in Middle Eastern energy sources [would] threaten to put at a disadvantage the very allies—India, Japan, South Korea, and even much of Europe—that America needs to balance China. If these countries became dependent on China for their energy supplies they would have to align their foreign and economic policies with China, which would mean moving away from the United States. That would put a big dent into our plans for containing China in the Asia Pacific and ensuring the region’s continued prosperity and openness” (Ibid., Location 3876). His appraisal seems prophetic in light of the recent tour of the Middle East undertaken by Chinese President Xi Jinping. With stops in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran, the trip illustrates China’s strategy to bridge both sides of the dangerous Shiite-Sunni divide in which America has taken a decidedly Sunni bent. China is the largest trading partner with all three powerful Middle Eastern states (“Xi Jinping’s tour of the Middle East shows China’s growing stake there.” The Economist, 20 Jan. 2016. Web.) Nasr reminds his readers that the world has become far too interconnected to allow us to focus on any particular region at the expense of the rest. To do so would be to apply 20^th century Containment policy on a fluid 21^th century world, no more useful than trying to grab a handful of water.

       It’s unsurprising that Nasr left the Administration embittered. Brought into government on a wave of hope for change and into a State Department led by respected personalities such as Secretary of State Clinton and Ambassador Holbrooke, Nasr expected to be able to achieve what he saw as a triumphant success in American relations with the Middle East. What he found, instead, were the harsh realities of a region and US government pulled apart by various entrenched and opposing interests. Nasr’s very unwillingness to recognize the validity of competing interests in the Administration highlights the desperate need for American leaders, across agencies and the White House staff and throughout both parties, to see that in order to engender compromise and success globally, we must first be willing to reach out with compromise at home.

--Benjamin Spacapan

In the Nation's Service: A Review of Leon Panetta's "Worthy Fights"

Leon Panetta's account of his life, summed up in the aptly titled Worthy Fights, is a self-aware journey from his upbringing in Monterrey, California to his years as Secretary of Defense.  As a former Congressman, Budget Director, and Chief of Staff, Panetta was not an obvious choice for a senior national security role, but his sound analytical thinking and organizational leadership experience made him an excellent choice to head two of the largest and most important organizations in the American government.    As with any memoir, the perspectives in Worthy Fights are colored by personal opinion, and Panetta begins with intimate reflections on his personal life and early years of public service.  He quickly moves to  what will fascinate most readers, spending nearly two-thirds of his autobiography on his recently completed service as Director of the CIA (DCI), followed by appointment as Secretary of Defense.

A loyal former member of the Obama Administration, Panetta initially is quick to defend the President's policy directives, but his frustration with the Executive grows palpably throughout the work.  His disapproval is most clearly illustrated through his discussion of two key foreign policy issues.  Panetta unabashedly criticizes the Congressional leadership for its inability to avoid the sequester, which cut the Defense budget disastrously, and although more reserved in his criticism of the Administration’s handling of the fiasco, he suggest that the President did not lead effectively through the turmoil.  He deflects blame from the President for the friction between the departments and the national security staff, but he bluntly pans the Executive’s role in the withdrawal from Iraq and unwillingness to stand behind its declarations on Syria.  He demonstrates that potentially fixable problems were allowed to spiral out of control due to a lack of strong leadership in either Congress or the White House.  All parties chose politics over the national interest. While the leadership in Congress and the Administration failed to come together on a number of important national security issues, Panetta cautions in stern words that they must work together in the future to avoid the same types of mistakes.  Having served the federal government in both the legislative and executive branches on both sides of aisle, Secretary Panetta is uniquely suited to deliver the critical message that the country is in dire need of bipartisan leadership.

            The CIA served as Panetta’s primer in national security, and his appointment along with those of Secretaries Gates (Defense) and Clinton (State) represent the highlights of the new President’s foreign policy decision making.  Panetta notes that Robert Gates, a holdover at Defense from Bush's administration, represented "an important gesture of continuity" and bi-partisanship and that Hillary Clinton at State was "a luminous representative" and "a smart, forceful advocate in meetings of the president's top advisers" (Ibid.).  These three shared prior personal relationships–Panetta and Gates worked together on the Iraq Study Group, and Panetta is open about his support for Clinton in the presidential primaries (Ibid., Chapter 9). They were also the three figures in the initial Obama Cabinet with the highest profiles before joining the Executive Branch.  Their prominence magnifies their frustration and clashes with the White House.

Panetta's first interactions with Congress as DCI were smooth, with unanimous support for his appointment in the Senate committee (Ibid.).  Ultimately, however,  DCI Panetta describes members of both parties using his trips to the Hill to launch partisan attacks (Ibid).  In one episode, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi cynically denied having been briefed on the use of waterboarding, in effect falsely accusing CIA employees of committing a federal offense (Ibid.).  Though Ms. Pelosi eventually admitted that she had been briefed, her actions constitute a dangerous trend of politicization in national defense.

            Congress was not the only source of trouble from within the government for Panetta during his time as DCI.  When the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created by Congress, roles and responsibilities were not adequately divided between the DCI and DNI.  As a result, Panetta recounts DNI Denny Blair’s public attempts to appoint CIA Station Chiefs (Ibid.).  When Panetta balked at the move, Blair presented him with a fait accompli, “ignored [Panetta’s] request and that same day signed the new policy, which was forwarded to the field staff that evening” (Ibid.).  Panetta countermanded the order, but the fact that the conflict aired in front of the entire agency was a dangerous diversion of attention and resources from the business of national defense.  Further, Panetta writes that Blair refused to accept a decision by Biden arbitrating the issue, and tried to bypass him by going to the President (Ibid.).  That this kind of insubordination and infighting was allowed to continue in the Administration raises concerning questions about the resoluteness of the national security leadership.  Panetta is unable to hide his disdain for Blair and for the position of DNI.  In so doing, he discounts the obvious need for better communication and coordination between the nation’s intelligence organizations, the purpose for which DNI was created.   Despite his obvious feelings on the structure of the intelligence community, Panetta’s coverage of his time in the Obama White House serves as a call for better coordination and communication across the national security leadership.

            To this end, Panetta recounts that NSC chief of staff John McDonough and Tom Donilon did not allow Panetta, Gates, or other senior cabinet members to speak to the media or Congress.  He writes that their actions were “an overreaction that deprived the White House of some of its more capable public spokesmen” (Ibid.).  Panetta diplomatically notes that because David Axelrod and David Plouffe, top White House political consultants, were therefore the most regular representatives of the Administration, “their highly visible role had the effect of overemphasizing the political side of important policy decisions” (Ibid.).  Panetta leaves unsaid the implication that the reason political consultants so often delivered the President’s decisions was perhaps because they had the central role in setting policy.

            Panetta loses his diplomatic tone when describing the Administration and Congress becomes during the run-up to the sequester.  Panetta initially almost apologetically describes the defense cut agreed to by the President, $487 billion over a decade, admitting that the Department “could endure those cuts for a few years, but after a while the fat would be gone and we’d be gouging into muscle” (Ibid., Chapter 15).  Beyond the planned cuts, Panetta describes the Congressional ‘Super Committee’s’ inability to find $1 trillion in further government cuts to avoid a self-imposed sequester. This cut another $500 billion from the defense budget over the decade, which he characterizes as “stunning, a return to the goofy, meat-axe approach” of the 1980s (Ibid.).  Panetta further lambasted the leadership, writing, “I was struck in those sessions by the absence of serious leadership in either chamber.” (Ibid.) 

With the onset of the sequester, Panetta dispenses with his apologies for the Administration, writing that he was not encouraged to pursue an offer of $100 billion in further cuts to the Super Committee because White House strategists were worried he would cut a separate deal to spare defense. He continued that other cabinet members largely refused to enter the budget debate despite impending cuts.  Panetta recounts that it was “symptomatic of what I regarded as a problem with President Obama’s use of his cabinet,” that “President Obama’s decision-making apparatus was centralized in the White House” (Ibid.).  He continues, it had “the effect of reducing the importance of the cabinet members who actually oversaw the agencies,” and that “neither Congress nor the public got the benefit of their insights into what was about to transpire” because “[the Cabinet] waited for permission to object.  It never came” (Ibid.).  That these cuts could have been allowed to go into effect truly is shocking, made all the more so by the lack of leadership for compromise exhibited in dealing with the problem during the months when disaster could have been averted.

Panetta writes of the Super Committee, “Having put the gun to its own head and loaded it up, Congress decided to fire it” (Ibid.).  His unabashed criticism of all those involved with the debacle provides insightful commentary on an issue which has been clouded in politicization stemming from statements of the same leaders who were more concerned with the politics of the Sequester’s aftermath than its actual occurrence.  Panetta implies the episode has become emblematic of an inability or unwillingness to work together in Congress and the White House, and is an important warning for the damage threatened by continued intransigence on all sides.

The most prominent and biting criticism of our leaders emerges from Panetta’s account of the withdrawal of troops from Iraq.  He describes the even more pronounced political leadership problems in Iraq, where political gain and sectarianism among the ruling elite was endemic under Prime Minister Maliki.  The Secretary writes that after years at war, “withdrawing our forces would endanger the fragile stability then barely holding Iraq together.”  Sounding similar to America’s elected officials, “Privately, the various leadership factions in Iraq all confided that they wanted some U.S. forces to remain as a bulwark against sectarian violence.  But none were willing to take that position publicly” (Ibid.).  Despite this position from Iraqi leaders, Panetta insists “We had leverage,” and he “privately and publicly advocated leaving behind a residual force that could provide training and security for Iraq’s military” with the support of U.S. senior military officers (Ibid.).  Sadly, his counsel and publicity campaign were in vain. 

Dropping his diplomatic tone, Panetta writes, “the White House as so eager to rid itself of Iraq that it was willing to withdraw rather than lock in arrangements that would preserve our influence and interests” (Ibid.).  He admits, “To my frustration, the White House coordinated the negotiations [to maintain a residual force in Iraq] but never really led them,” and “without the President’s active advocacy, Maliki was allowed to slip away” (Ibid.). Panetta wrote, “After all we have done to decimate Al Qaeda’s senior leadership and its core, those efforts will be for naught if we allow it to rebuild a base of operations in the Middle East” (Ibid.).  He was so embittered by the American withdrawal from Iraq that he closes his discussion of the issue on a noticeably sarcastic note.  He quotes his comments to a soldier at the final US base closure, “We may be ending the war, but we are not walking away from our responsibilities,” and follows his quote with, “That was an expression of hope rather than fact” (Ibid.).  One can hardly disagree with the sentiment, especially in light of the current ISIS occupation of swathes of that country, but the flippant remark from a former American Secretary of Defense on a war which cost the nation billions of dollars and, more importantly, thousands of lives is disappointing.

            Despite this raw criticism, Panetta recovers a diplomatic tone in his conclusion, where he astutely summarizes the major issues of his public life.  He highlights his greatest disappointments, including the failure of the government to avoid the sequester and the abrupt and mistaken withdrawal from Iraq.  Panetta underscores the problems in Congress, placing somewhat less emphasis on commensurate issues in the White House.  He writes of the Congress, “Elected to help their country, they willfully and deliberately hurt it. (Ibid., Chapter 17).  Of Obama, he says “Too often, in my view, the President relies on the logic of a law professor rather than the passion of a leader” (Ibid.).  Panetta saves his most stinging criticism for the White House’s lack of defined response to the use of chemical weapons during the Syrian Civil War:

“The result, I felt, was a blow to American credibility.  When the president as commander in chief draws a red line, it is critical that he act if the line is crossed.  The power of the United States rests on its word, and clear signals are important both to deter adventurism and to reassure allies that we can be counted on.  Assad’s actions clearly defied President Obama’s warning; by failing to respond, it sent the wrong message to the world” (Ibid.).

In the epilogue to his memoirs, Panetta writes, “my time in government has let me witness the possibilities of effective leadership and the consequences of failure” (Ibid., Epilogue).  Panetta’s memoirs transform readers into co-witnesses, wrapping anecdotes and judgements on the American government and its characters in entertaining stories that effortlessly keep the reader’s attention.  Just underneath the veneer of a storyteller is a clear-eyed appraisal which measures the current members of Congress and the Executive Branch against those he encountered earlier in his career and, by and large, finds them lacking, unwilling to take short-term political risks in the name of long-term national interest.  Because he accomplishes this through stories which render the conclusion obvious to the reader, Panetta’s tone is disappointed rather than bitter.  In a world in which embittered tell-all’s have become the norm, Secretary Panetta reminds us the value of allowing the reader to come to his or her own conclusion based on a balanced and insightful rendition of facts.

 

--By Benjamin Spacapan

IS Likely to Increase Attempts to Raid and Control Three Specific Roads

Proper logistical and strategic planning are absolutely vital in warfare, especially in a conflict where a belligerent has limited resources.

The massive volume of FSA/Islamists forces engaging the SAA/allies in Northern Hama and the Ghab plain has required large numbers of SAA/allied reinforcements to be dispatched to those areas. The RuAF has been occupied disproportionately with this front, as compared to all other ongoing SAA/allied efforts (ex: Palmyra, Aleppo).

Controlling infrastructure is not as exciting or symbolic as capturing a population center or military facility. However, it is often of much higher value. Controlling highways allows for the transportation of manpower and equipment and the evacuation of wounded at an accelerated rate. It also prevents the enemy from the same benefits, and can also isolate pockets of militants behind newly established front lines.

Specific to the IS: there exists several highways, currently held by SAA/allied forces, which are close to IS front lines. These include Khanasir to al-Ithriyah, al-Ithriyah to Sabburah, and Furqlus to Palmyra.

Controlling these stretches of highways serves another purpose: linking three important areas of IS operations (Raqqa, Palmyra, and Eastern Homs). Controlling these transportation lanes would improve the ability of the IS to fluidly transfer men and equipment to the most active front quickly.

The additional benefit is a force multiplier. Although the IS fights the FSA and Islamist groups as frequently as the SAA/allies, the IS has an interest in causing both sides to lose men and equipment. A way to accelerate this phenomenon is to encourage conditions to foment the already existing conflict between the FSA/Islamists and the SAA/allies. By cutting the aforementioned highways, IS would isolate large pockets of SAA/allied territory from each other (Aleppo separated from Hama, Homs from Palmyra) and further escalate the danger and difficulty of traveling from Homs to Hama. If SAA/allied reinforcements are slower to reinforce SAA/allied positions, the FSA/Islamists have a higher chance of success at any engagement. As such, those groups are more likely to instigate wider and more frequent attacks. This causes casualties and equipment loss to both groups; consequently reducing the assets either can use against IS units both immediately and in the future.

This tactic is also useful in limiting the RuAF power in the conflict. A raiding operation, designed to destroy a checkpoint and install IEDs, can be successful without requiring a concentration of men and equipment, unlike an assault on a defended town or large military installation. As such, Syrian airpower and especially Russian close-air-support are much less effective against small, loosely concentrated guerilla-like forces. Given the SAA/allied large advantage from air superiority, the IS is most likely to adopt new tactics designed at limiting their enemies relative military advantages.

We have already seen the IS disrupt the Khanasir to al-Ithriyah highway with recent raids. This resulted in the IS capturing equipment, killing SAA fighters, and closing that highway temporarily. That one offensive alone was reported to have hampered food supplies to Aleppo city and demanded immediate attention of the SAA. The SAA had to divert manpower to reestablish control and clear IEDs, which reduced the amount of fighters who could have been able to join the SAA/allied offensive against the FSA/Islamists in the South Western Aleppo countryside.

We also know this is an increasingly common technique in the conflict. The IS recently(ish) seized Qaryatayn, a crossroad population center which connected Damascus to Palmyra. They very recently assaulted Sadad, a mostly empty town. The Sadad attack was not ordered for a tactical reason, to inflict casualties or establish a remote salient, but instead was a strategic choice to attempt to close one of the Damascus to Homs highways.

We have also seen this occur on smaller scales by other forces. Jays al-Islam's recent offensive put a large priority in cutting the highway adjacent to the Eastern Ghouta pocket. Again, the highway served as a major artery from Damascus to Homs. Jays al-Islam has prioritized defending this highway over continuing its assault on military/government strongholds, such as Brigade 39, the adjacent armored vehicle base, and the Adra prison.

Many Kurdish groups, likely with the assistance of Western military/intelligence planning, have also implemented this strategy with some success against the IS. Al-Shaddadi is connected to Mosul on a singular stretch of highway which passes through both Sinjar and Tal Afar. Kurdish groups have focused on controlling the highway on either side of Sinjar before the eventual assault on the city.

Consequently, I believe the IS will soon adopt a more conscious and concerted effort in raiding and controlling these areas. The direct and indirect benefits that disruption and/or control over these logistical assets appears to have the highest benefit to risk payoff available to the IS at this time.

--Jeff Chester